Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are en vogue both as policy tool, as well as research subject. We do not beg to differ. In this paper, inspired by the in-going negotiations between the EU (European Union) and the US (United States) on the TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), we ask whether the conclusion of the agreement will, among other things, signal fewer disputes between the two partners before the WTO. This could happen either because there will be a forum diversion (litigate before the bilateral forum with the same or different intensity), or because differences of opinion will be addressed in extra-judicial manner. Our prediction is that, judging from past behaviour, e.g. the amount of litigation between the EU and the US with their preferential partners before and after they had signed an agreement with them, it is quite likely that they will litigate less against each other before the WTO. Without assigning causal relationship to the signature of a bilateral agreement and the amount of litigation between preferential partners, we show that there is inverse correlation between the two. It remains to be seen whether the WTO will profit or suffer from the likelihood of fewer disputes between the two largest trading partners.
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Introduction
To date, nearly 500 disputes have been brought to the WTO. Together, the EU and the US account for more than 40 percent of all WTO disputes both as complainants and as defendants, with bilateral EU-US disputes (including those with individual EU members) accounting for nearly one-third of the disputes involving the two blocs.
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework to assess what could be the consequences of TTIP, the bilateral EU-US trade and investment partnership, on trade disputes between the two transatlantic partners and, ultimately, on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) itself. To this effect, we have put together data of all the WTO disputes between, on one hand, the EU and the US, and, on the other, their PTA partners, both before and after such PTAs were signed or even initiated. 1 The EU and the US are party to some PTA agreements (such as NAFTA) that predate the creation of the WTO in 1995 and have entered into several new agreements afterwards. For pre-WTO agreements, we focus on PTA partners with whom the EU or the US have engaged in WTO disputes. For post-WTO agreements, we concentrate on PTA partners with whom the EU or the US had WTO disputes before the signature of the PTA agreement. Consequently, we did not include in our data information about all PTAs signed by the two transatlantic partners, but only information regarding those PTA partners with whom the EU or the US had a WTO dispute (for pre-WTO PTAs) or a WTO dispute before the signature of the PTA (for post-WTO PTAs).
We do not purport to suggest that we will come up with some sort of causal link between PTA-partnership and litigation behavior. It is doubtful that such conclusion can be reached, not to mention that it is doubtful that economic analysis has much to say about causation in general. We simply want to see whether litigation behaviour is correlated with the occurrence of the signature of a PTA (or the launch of negotiation).
1 PTAs between the US and its partners typically enter into force at the same time or shortly after their signature. By contrast the delay between the time of signature and entry into force of PTAs between the EU and its partners is often one year or more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes the data. In Section 3, we discuss the data, and explain why in our view data supports the observation that the signature of a PTA signals the reduction of litigation between PTA partners before the WTO (and elsewhere). Section 4 offers, instead of conclusions, an evaluation of the impact that the prospect of reduced litigation between the EU and the US might have for the WTO.
The Data
We reproduce the data that we have used for this paper in Tables 1-8. Tables 1 and 2 present the PTAs that we examine in this paper, whereas Tables 7 and 8 show the PTAs which are being negotiated by the EU or the US at the moment of writing.
Tables 3-6 present the litigation that the EU and the US have had with their PTApartners since the entry into force of the WTO (January 1, 1995) . It is by comparing the date a request for consultations was submitted before the DSB (the Dispute Settlement Body, the competent organ to administer dispute adjudication at the WTO) to the date of signature of a PTA (or launch of investigations) that we come up with the number indicating that we observe fewer disputes post-signature of a PTA.
Two caveats are in order here. We include all disputes that were formally launched (e.g. the DSB was notified of a request for consultations) before the WTO. We do not care if disputes are of certain magnitude or not. 2 We do not ask questions regarding the 'optimal' number of disputes that the EU, and the US should have had because of their size. 3 We take the number of disputes as given.
US and PTA Partners
Recall that the cut-off date for all data discussed in this paper is January 1, 1995.
The US has had in total 59 WTO disputes with PTA partners (including before the PTA agreements were signed): 6 disputes with Australia (4 acting as complainant, 2 acting as defendant); 20 with Canada (5 complainant, 15 respondent); 2 with Chile (1 complainant, 1 defendant); 16 with Korea (6 complainant, 10 defendant); 15 with 2 Bown and Reynolds (2015) provide data to this effect. 3 Horn et al. (2005) advance thoughts on this score.
Mexico (6 complainant, 9 defendant); 1 with Colombia (defendant); and, finally, 1 with Costa Rica (defendant). See Tables 5 and 6.
US and Future PTA Partners
The US is currently negotiating two PTAs: the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam; and the TTIP with the EU. See Table 8 The EU and the US have not initiated a WTO complaint against each other since July 2013, when the TTIP negotiations were launched. They litigated 51 times since the advent of the WTO, and before the launch of the TTIP negotiations. The U.S acted as complainant 19 times (DS 13, 16, 26, 27, 82, 104, 115, 124, 158, 172, 174, 223, 260, 291, 315, 316, 347, 375, 389) . 4 The EU, in turn, acted as complainant 32 times (DS 38, 39, 63, 85, 88, 100, 108, 118, 136, 138, 151, 152, 160, 165, 166, 176, 186, 200, 212, 213, 214, 217, 225, 248, 262, 294, 317, 319, 320, 350, 353, 424) .
Regarding the TPP partners, we limit our observations to Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam since the US has already concluded a PTA with the remaining TPP partners.
The US had litigated 14 times with Japan before the launch of the TPP negotiations (6 times acting as complainant : DS 11, 28, 44, 45, 76, 245; 14 times acting as defendant: DS 6, 45, 162, 184, 217, 244, 249, 322) , and none after the launch. It had litigated once with Malaysia (DS 58), the US acting as defendant, before the launch of the negotiations, and none ever since. It had acted as defendant twice against New Zealand (DS 177, 258) before the launch of negotiations, and none after that. And, finally, it has litigated twice with Vietnam (DS 404, 429), acting always as defendant, once before and once after the launch of the TPP negotiations. The US has never litigated with Brunei, Peru and Singapore.
EU and PTA Partners
The EU has had much fewer WTO disputes with PTA partners (including before the PTA agreements were signed) than the US: only 23, including 5 disputes with Chile (3 acting as complainant, 2 acting as defendant); 1 with Colombia (respondent); 3 each with Guatemala and Honduras (defendant); 7 with Korea (4 complainant, 3 respondent); 6 with Mexico (3 complainant, 3 defendant); 3 with Norway (defendant); and 1 with Peru (defendant). 5 See Tables 3 and 4 .
EU and Future PTA Partners
Besides TTIP, the EU is currently negotiating PTAs with Canada, India, Japan and Singapore. See Table 7 .
The EU had litigated before the WTO 15 times with Canada before the launch of bilateral negotiations (6 times acting as complainant: DS 114, 117, 142, 321, 354, 426;  9 times acting as defendant: DS 7, 9, 48, 135, 137, 153, 292, 369, 400) , and none after the launch. It had litigated 14 times with India before the launch of bilateral negotiations (9 times as complainants: DS 79, 96, 120, 146, 149, 150, 279, 304, 352 But where the main contrast lies between the EU and the US is with respect to PTAs that pre-date the creation of the WTO. Although the EU is party to many more such PTAs than the US, it has litigated only 3 times before the WTO with an 'old' PTA partner, each time with Norway. On the other hand the US has litigated 35 times before the WTO with its two NAFTA partners (20 times with Canada and 15 times with Mexico. We will discuss why NAFTA looks different than other PTAs in terms of WTO litigation.
Even Fewer, if we Discount Old Battles
It is reasonable to hypothesize that on-going WTO disputes between future PTA partners are one of the subjects negotiated during the negotiation leading to the signature of a PTA. We define as 'old' WTO (or even GATT) disputes those litigated before the signing of a PTA, and 'new' those initiated after the signature of the PTA.
We then discount 'old' disputes from our counting when measuring the litigation behavior of PTA partners. The intuition is that new issues are resolved in ways other than submitting a formal dispute before a WTO Panel.
Even Fewer Disputes after the Launch of Negotiations
The US has litigated before the WTO only once with Vietnam since the launch of TPP negotiations, and never with the EU since the launch of the TTIP negotiations. The same holds for the EU which has not litigated with Canada, Japan or the US since the launch of their PTA negotiations. The timespan, however, for all these cases is quite short and does not allow for strong conclusions. Interestingly the EU has litigated 3 times with India since the launch of their bilateral negotiations, perhaps precisely because these negotiations have lasted longer than other PTA negotiations.
Fewer Disputes in General: no Forum Diversion
We also check disputes raised before the PTA-forum to see whether forum-diversion has occurred. In this case, the EU or the US would be 'doves' before the WTO, because they behaved like 'hawks' in the bilateral forum. Our data supports our conclusion that this has not been the case. They become 'doves' across the board after signing PTAs.
According to Chase et al. (2013) , dispute settlement mechanisms in PTAs fall in three categories: political/diplomatic; quasi-judicial; and judicial. Political or diplomatic mechanisms are those that have no dispute settlement provisions at all, that provide exclusively for negotiated settlement among the parties or that provide for referral of a dispute to a third-party adjudicator but with the PTA members having a right to veto such referral. By contrast, both quasi-judicial and judicial systems involve decisions by an adjudicating body, but only the latter implies the existence of a permanent adjudicating body such as the WTO's DSB.
As Table 12 indicates, two-thirds of the PTAs notified to the WTO until 2012 belonged to the quasi-judicial category. Table 13 indicates that today all the PTAs involving the US are quasi-judicial. The situation is slightly different for PTAs involving the EU. Here the majority is also quasi-judicial, but PTAs with some European partners have political/diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms.
Turning to the PTAs examined in this paper, we observe that all but one contain a quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover these mechanisms are binding. What do we mean by 'binding', and why is it important for the purposes of our work?
We define 'binding' dispute settlement regimes those that allow for countermeasures by parties facing un-cooperative behavior (non-implementation of adverse rulings). 6 If no dispute settlement exists, or if it exists but it has no teeth (it is not 'binding'), then we should contemplate the following: either the EU or the US have become 'doves' by force; or, they act as 'hawks' before the WTO. The outlier is the EU-Norway PTA signed on July 1, 1973, which contains no dispute settlement regime at all. We suggest it should not be treated as outlier though since Norway can of course access the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Court, which is a 'binding' regime that handles, inter alia, disputes between EEA (European Economic Area) members, which include both Norway and the EU.
As stated supra, our data supports the view that the EU and the US become 'doves' after the signature of an FTA. Ideally, we would like to have a binomial, say 0 is 'dove' and 1 is 'hawk'. Unsurprisingly, this is wishful thinking that has no support in empirics. The emerging picture though, largely supports the conclusion that both the EU and the US behave more like 'doves' towards their PTA partners. This conclusion is even more robust when we adopt the 'old'-/'new' disputes dichotomy explained supra. We are not suggesting that the EU, US become 'doves' because of the signing of the FTA. We are simply stating that they become 'doves' after this event.
3.5 Is NAFTA an Outlier?
The US has litigated before the WTO fifteen times with Mexico since January 1, 1995: six times acting as complainant (DS 101, 132, 203, 204, 295, 308) , and nine times as defendant (DS 49, 234, 280, 281, 282, 325, 344, 381, 386 ).
When we apply our distinction between 'old' and 'new' disputes to NAFTA, this is what we obtain. DS 101, 132, 308 refer to the old sugar disputes between Mexico and the US. HuertaGoldman (2009) reports attempts to resolve these disputes during the NAFTA negotiations, which were unsuccessful. DS 280, 282, 325, 344 refer to steel disputes that had been raised before the advent of the WTO, and which were then negotiated in NAFTA without success. DS 281 also refers to an old cement dispute. Mexico had submitted a GATT dispute on this issue, which had gone unresolved before the creation of the WTO.
DS 381 is an offshoot of the notorious GATT dispute between the two NAFTA partners regarding the marketing of tuna products in the US market.
DS 308 is an offshoot of a NAFTA dispute, whereas DS 386 is about the treatment of cattle, another issue that had been negotiated without success during the NAFTA negotiations.
As a result, there are only five disputes (DS 49, 203, 204, 234, 295) between Mexico and the US that are genuinely WTO disputes, rather than continuations of GATT disputes that were unresolved during the NAFTA negotiations or of unresolved NAFTA disputes. Note also that none of these five disputes has taken place since When it comes to Canada-US disputes, applying the 'old'/'new' distinction, this is what we obtain.
In total the two North American partners have litigated against each other before the WTO 20 times: the US acted as complainant five times (DS 31, 103, 170, 276, 338) , and as defendant fifteen times (DS 144, 167, 180, 194, 221, 234, 236, 247, 257, 264, 277, 310, 311, 357, 384) .
The softwood lumber disputes are long-standing battles between Canada and the US due to the so-called 'stumpage programs' adopted by Canada, that the US always considered constituted a subsidy. They date from the GATT era and were finally amicably resolved in 2008 after numerous WTO disputes (DS 236, 257, 247, 264, 277, 311) .
Cattle, dairy products and grain have been extensively litigated both in the Canada-US FTA as well as NAFTA without the two partners managing to resolve the issue. This led to a number of WTO disputes (DS 103, 144, 167, 276, 310, 338, 357, 384) .
The cultural exception in the bilateral agreement between Canada and the US, as well as in NAFTA, was unsufficient to resolve the dispute on split-run periodicals and led to one WTO dispute (DS 31).
The sugar syrup (high fructose) dispute (DS 180) arose because NAFTA was poorly The situation in the EU is both different and similar to the US situation. What is different is that even though all EU PTAs examined here (including EU-Norway when considering the possibility of using the EFTA Court) contain quasi-judicial, binding dispute settlement mechanisms, they have never been used. It seems that disputes are either resolved politically or give rise to litigation before the WTO. What is similar is that many of the WTO disputes between the EU and its PTA partners are, like those between the US and its two NAFTA partners, old ones. This is the case for most of the disputes that took place before the signature of the PTAs, in particular the three banana disputes with Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico (DS 16, 27, 158) which all date back to the GATT era.
Conclusion: Are Fewer Disputes Good News for the WTO?
Of the nearly 500 disputes that have been brought to the WTO during the past 20 years, more than 70 percent involve the EU or the US, usually against third parties but also sometime against each other.
As Table 9 indicates the number of WTO disputes has steadily declined over the past 20 years. From an average of 37 per year during the first five years, it declined to 27 during the next five years and has averaged 16 during the last 10 years. Part of the reason for this decline has to do with the fact that the WTO inherited a stock of disputes that had been left unresolved during the GATT era, which the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism was able to resolve decisively during its first decade of operation. But the other reason is that, independently of the previous reason, the EU and the US have sharply reduced their litigation activity, which dropped by more 50 percent between 1995-2004 and 2005-2014. This paper suggests that one factor behind the decreased litigation activity in the WTO has been the increasing number of PTAs among WTO members. Indeed the paper documents that, at least as far as the EU and the US are concerned, the signature (or even perhaps the start of negotiation) of PTAs is associated with a sharp reduction in litigation activity between PTA members. It is to be expected, therefore, that the successful conclusion of the TPP and TTIP negotiations as well as the EU-India and EU-Japan negotiations would further reduce the number of WTO disputes.
While a reduction in trade litigation should in principle be welcomed, there are also reasons for caution about the fact that PTAs seem to be associated with a reduction in WTO litigation. To the extent that the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism is characterized by fairness and transparency, its relative demise could be a loss for weaker parties within and outside the PTAs.
For the weaker party to a PTA, like most partners of the EU and the US, the absence of WTO (and also formal PTA) litigation might mean that disputes are resolved in the old political/diplomatic fashion, which naturally gives more power to the stronger party. Unfortunately this study has not been able to establish why the signature of PTAs with the EU or the US might lead to a lowering of WTO litigation nor whether there are disputes between the parties and if so how they are resolved. Certainly the TTIP would be different from other PTAs in this respect since the two partners are of equal economic size. Whether this means that bilateral EU-US disputes would continue to be adjudicated by the WTO or instead would go to their bilateral DSM forum is obviously difficult to say based on this study.
For third parties, i.e. countries outside a PTA, the absence of WTO litigation between PTA members might mean, especially if PTA disputes are resolved in a political/diplomatic fashion, less transparency and potentially harmful consequences. Whether such harmful consequences rise with the aggregate economic size of the PTA members, as one would expect, and therefore that TTIP would be especially damaging in this respect, is again difficult to say based on this study.
In conclusion we can safely assert that PTAs seem to be associated with greater peace among PTA members, though we cannot say whether the benefits of such peace is fairly distributed between members and whether non-members benefit as well or Quasi-judicial 65
Judicial 5
All 100
Source: Chase et al. (2013) . 
